The correlation between capital inflows and outflows has increased substantially over time in a sample of 128 advanced and developing countries. We provide evidence that this is a result of an increase in financial globalization (stock of external assets and liabilities). This dominates the effect of an increase in trade globalization (exports plus imports), which reduces the correlation between capital inflows and outflows. In the context of a two-country model with 14 shocks we show that the theoretical impact of financial and trade globalization on the correlation between capital inflows and outflows is consistent with the data.
Introduction
Gross international asset positions and capital ‡ows have grown enormously in size over the past three decades, which has raised signi…cant concerns about …nancial and macroeconomic stability in the face of surges and stops of capital ‡ows. However, Forbes and Warnock (2012) point out that a sudden stop of capital in ‡ows is increasingly accompanied by reduced out ‡ows (retrenchment), dampening the impact on net ‡ows. 1 Similarly, large capital ‡ight (out ‡ows) is increasingly accompanied by a surge in capital in ‡ows. Broner et al. (2013) document that capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows have become signi…cantly more correlated in countries of all income levels from the 1980s to the 2000s and are highest in high-income countries. The objective of this paper is to shed light on what drives this phenomenon of increasingly correlated in ‡ows and out ‡ows. There has been some discussion in the literature about why capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows would be positively correlated at all. Broner et al. (2013) argue that one would expect a negative correlation in a model with time-varying expected returns, as for example in RBC models with productivity shocks. A higher expected return in the United States should lead both US and foreign investors to shift their portfolio to the US, leading to larger US capital in ‡ows and lower out ‡ows. The same negative correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows can be expected when there are changes in the relative riskiness of US assets. Broner et al. (2013) argue that without …nancial or other frictions, we cannot explain the positive correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
Tille and van Wincoop (2010) provide a broader perspective on the relationship between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows from a portfolio perspective. Capital ‡ows have a portfolio growth component (associated with saving) and a portfolio reallocation component (e.g. due to changes in expected returns and risk). The portfolio growth component can generate a positive correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows when saving is positively correlated across countries. Portfolio reallocation generates a negative correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows when domestic and foreign agents face the same portfolio problem and therefore shift their portfolios in the same direction, as in the examples above. Broner et al. (2013) therefore emphasize that asymmetries across countries are needed to generate a positive correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows across countries.
Many examples of such asymmetries have been developed in the literature, leading to di¤erences in expected returns and risk from the perspective of domestic and foreign investors and contributing to a positive correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Expected returns may be di¤erent across countries due to information asymmetries (Tille and van Wincoop (2014) , Brennan and Cao (1997) ) or to costs associated with investing abroad. Foreign assets may be perceived to be riskier due to exchange rate risk (Broner et al. (2013) ) or expropriation risk (Gourio et al. (2016) ). An increase in global risk or risk-aversion will then lead to a general retrenchment towards domestic assets, lowering both in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Such a global retrenchment is documented by MilesiFerretti and Tille (2011) for the 2008-2009 global …nancial crisis. 2 Rey (2013) casts this more broadly as part of a global …nancial cycle. 3 Tille and van Wincoop (2010) show that in ‡ows and out ‡ows become positively correlated due to various types of time-varying risk that impact foreign and domestic investors di¤erently. This may be due to a di¤erent optimal hedge against in ‡ation or future expected returns or non-asset income. 4 In this paper the aim is not to explain a positive correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, but rather the signi…cant increase in this correlation over time and the much higher correlation in developed countries than in developing countries. For example, in Table 2 we report that among industrialized countries the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, normalized by external assets and liabilities, rose from 0.25 during to 0.87 during 1990-2011. For emerging markets the increase was from 0.07 to 0.48. Similar numbers apply when we divide capital ‡ows by GDP. The explanation for this phenomenon does not require larger asymmetries across countries, as the discussion above might suggest. It also does not require a larger size of the shocks that are responsible for a positive correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows, such as larger global risk shocks. The explanation is much simpler. We argue that it is a simple corollary of …nancial globalization.
To understand this better, it is useful to distinguish between net ‡ows and gross ‡ows. Net ‡ows, N F , are equal to capital out ‡ows minus in ‡ows, which equals the current account. These are commonly referred to as "global imbalances." We de…ne gross ‡ows, GF , as the sum of capital out ‡ows and in ‡ows. It follows that Outf lows = 0:5GF + 0:5N F Inf lows = 0:5GF 0:5N F It is immediate that gross ‡ows generate a perfect positive correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows, while net ‡ows generate a perfect negative correlation. A higher correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows is then simply the result of a higher volatility of gross ‡ows relative to net ‡ows. More precisely, assuming the same variance of in ‡ows and out ‡ows, so that net and gross ‡ows are uncorrelated, we have
We then need to explain the increase in the volatility of gross ‡ows relative to the volatility of net ‡ows. We will argue that …nancial globalization (increased stock of external assets and liabilities) 3 The empirical importance of such a global …nancial cycle for capital ‡ows has been recently questioned by Cerutti, Claessens and Rose (2017). Gourio et.al. (2016) provide evidence that an increase in global risk reduces capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows of emerging markets. 4 Another, very di¤erent, reason for di¤erent portfolio shifts of domestic and foreign agents that lead in ‡ows and out ‡ows to be positively correlated is associated with o¢ cial capital ‡ows. When capital in ‡ows lead to an accumulation of reserves, they are combined with o¢ cial out ‡ows. We …nd this to be an important contributor to the correlation between total in ‡ows and out ‡ows of emerging markets. See also Bianchi, Hatchondo and Martinez (2016) . Yet another explanation is bank liquidity management, suggested by Davis (2015) , where banks reduce out ‡ows to manage liquidity when faced with a drop in in ‡ows.
raises the volatility of gross ‡ows relative to net ‡ows, while trade globalization (higher imports and exports) does the opposite. Financial globalization has signi…cantly outpaced trade globalization in recent decades, which accounts for the higher correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
We will con…rm this explanation empirically by considering a sample of 128 countries with annual data from 1970 to 2011. We show both in cross section and panel data that …nancial globalization generates a higher correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and a higher volatility of gross ‡ows relative to net ‡ows. The impact of trade globalization is more ambiguous, but the evidence points to a decrease in the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and a lower volatility of gross ‡ows relative to net ‡ows.
After documenting the empirical evidence, we develop a simple two period, two country model to shed light on the empirical …ndings. The model contains a wide variety of shocks: income shocks, expected asset payo¤ shocks, portfolio shocks, saving shocks, investment shocks and trade shocks. We then consider the impact of …nancial and trade globalization, while keeping the magnitude of all the shocks in the model unchanged. We do so by varying the parameters in the model that determine cross-border asset holdings and trade ‡ows, holding all else …xed.
The results in the model are consistent with the data. Financial globalization raises the volatility of gross ‡ows relative to net ‡ows and therefore raises the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, while trade globalization does the opposite. Furthermore, we …nd that a proportional increase in both trade and …nancial integration still leads to an increase in the relative volatility of gross ‡ows, and thus an increase in the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows. So while the rapid increase in …nancial globalization relative to trade globalization that has taken place over the past three decades has certainly led to an increased correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows, an increase in the correlation would have occurred even if trade and …nancial globalization had progressed at the same pace.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts in the data. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the results implied by the model. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Evidence
In this section we consider the empirical relationship between various capital ‡ow moments and …nancial and trade globalization. Financial globalization is measured as the sum of external assets and liabilities divided by GDP, while trade globalization is measured as exports plus imports divided by GDP. There are 128 countries in the sample, split into groups of 25 advanced economies and 103 emerging and developing economies. The full list of countries is presented in Table 1 .
Capital ‡ow moments are calculated using annual data from 1970 to 2011. Gross capital in ‡ow and out ‡ow data, as well as export and import data, are from the IMF's International Financial Statistics database. Data for the stock of external assets and liabilities are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), using their data update through 2011. 
Descriptive statistics
We will denote OF = outf lows and IF = inf lows. Net out ‡ows are N F = OF IF and gross ‡ows are GF = OF + IF . Table 2 provides four moments: the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, the standard deviations of net and gross capital ‡ows and their ratio. In the top panel of the table, capital out ‡ows and in ‡ows in each country are normalized by the previous year's sum of external assets and liabilities. In the bottom panel the same capital ‡ows are normalized by GDP in the previous year.
These statistics are presented for the pre-1990 sub-period ) and the post-1990 subperiod (1990-2011) for both the advanced economies and the emerging markets. In addition, since capital out ‡ows include central bank foreign exchange reserve accumulation, the statistics are presented both when reserve accumulation is included in capital out ‡ows and when it is excluded.
Turning …rst to the advanced economy sample, under both normalizations there is a sizable increase in the correlation between capital out ‡ows and in ‡ows between the pre-and post-1990 periods. The increase is from 0.25 to 0.87 when scaled by external assets and liabilities, and from 0.41 to 0.91 when scaled by GDP. We know from equation (1), presented in the introduction, that there is a positive monotonic relationship between this correlation and the standard deviation of gross ‡ows relative to the standard deviation of net ‡ows. Table 2 indeed con…rms that together with the sharp increase in the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows there is a large increase in the standard deviation of gross ‡ows relative to the standard deviation of net ‡ows from the preto post-1990 periods.
The value of Std (GF ) =Std (N F ), as well its change between sub-samples, is similar regardless of how we normalize capital ‡ows. However, the normalization does a¤ect the standard deviations of gross and net ‡ows individually. When normalizing by the sum of external assets and liabilities, the standard deviation of gross ‡ows barely changes between the two sub-samples and there is a sizable fall in the standard deviation of net ‡ows. When normalizing by GDP, there is little change in the standard deviation of net ‡ows, but there is a sizable increase in the standard deviation of gross ‡ows across the two periods.
Emerging markets and developing countries also experienced an increase in the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows across the sub-samples, though both the level of the correlation and its change are smaller than for advanced economies. The same is the case for the standard deviation of gross ‡ows relative to the standard deviation of net ‡ows. This is true whether or not reserve accumulation is included as part of capital out ‡ows. O¢ cial reserve accumulation has virtually no e¤ect on the statistics for advanced economies, but in emerging markets there is a sizable fall in the standard deviation of gross capital ‡ows, and the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows, when reserves are excluded. When capital in ‡ows lead to an accumulation of reserves, capital out ‡ows increase as well, as in Bianchi, Hatchondo and Martinez (2016).
A possible explanation for the increase in the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, as well as the higher correlation in advanced countries, is the higher degree of …nancial globalization. The bottom of Table 2 shows that between the earlier and later periods the stock of external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP more than tripled in the advanced economies, whereas it increased by about 60% in the emerging markets. Both country groups saw a similar, and much smaller, increase in the level of trade as a share of GDP. This change over time in …nancial and trade globalization is also illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 compares the two sub-periods for individual countries, while Figure 2 shows the time series for the average of both sets of countries. In almost all advanced countries there is a very large increase in external assets and liabilities as a fraction of GDP, while in most emerging markets the increase is far more modest. At the same time, the bottom charts of Figure 1 show that most countries in both groups either did not see an increase in trade or only a modest increase. Figure 2 shows that the average level of trade in advanced countries closely tracks that of emerging markets since the late 1970s. Table 3 presents results from multivariate regressions of the capital ‡ow moments on …nancial and trade globalization. The top panel in the table presents the results from a cross-sectional regression, where the capital ‡ow moments and averages of the independent variables for each country are calculated over the entire sample. The bottom panel presents the results from a panel data regression that uses the capital ‡ow moments and averages of the independent variables for both the pre-1990 and post-1990 subsamples. The panel regression includes country-…xed e¤ects.
The two regressions ask the same question in slightly di¤erent ways. The cross-sectional regression asks if across a sample of 128 countries, countries with a higher stock of external assets and liabilities tend to have more volatile gross capital ‡ows and greater correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. The panel data regression with country …xed e¤ects instead asks if a change in …nancial or trade globalization leads to a change in the capital ‡ow moments. First consider the cross section results. In line with our earlier intuition, …nancial globalization has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on both the correlation between out ‡ows and in ‡ows and the closely related ratio of the standard deviations of gross ‡ows and net ‡ows. While the positive impact of …nancial globalization on the ratio of the standard deviations of gross and net ‡ows is independent of the normalization of capital ‡ows, the impact on the standard deviations of gross and net ‡ows individually depends signi…cantly on normalization. When capital ‡ows are normalized by the stock of external assets and liabilities, …nancial globalization has a negative e¤ect on the standard deviation of net ‡ows and no e¤ect on the standard deviation of gross ‡ows. When instead capital ‡ows are normalized by GDP, …nancial globalization has no e¤ect on the standard deviation of net ‡ows and a positive e¤ect on the standard deviation of gross ‡ows.
The e¤ect of trade globalization in the cross sectional regressions is a bit more di¢ cult to discern. Under both normalizations it has a positive e¤ect on the volatility of net capital ‡ows and lowers the volatility of gross ‡ows relative to the volatility of net ‡ows, though the latter is only statistically signi…cant when capital ‡ows are normalized by GDP. Trade globalization lowers the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows when capital ‡ows are normalized by GDP, but the result is insigni…cant when normalized by external assets and liabilities. The e¤ect on the volatility of gross ‡ows also depends a lot on the normalization.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) argue that a cross-sectional regression can lead to a type of omitted variable bias. If there is some unobserved third factor that leads to a positive correlation between trade or …nancial openness and the variance of capital ‡ows in the cross section, omitted variable bias may occur. This may be a time-invariant gravity variable. Portes and Rey (2005) argue that the same gravity variables that a¤ect bilateral trade ‡ows also a¤ect …nancial ‡ows. Since this unobserved third factor is time invariant, we can control for it with a country-…xed e¤ect in a panel data regression.
The panel regression results are presented in the bottom half of Table 3 . The impact of …nancial globalization remains the same as in the cross section regression. Countries that experienced a relative large increase in …nancial globalization across the sub-periods saw a larger increase in the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. In contrast to the cross section regressions, trade does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on capital ‡ow moments in the panel regressions. This may be because the change in trade was not very large across the two sub-periods for most countries, as shown in the charts at the bottom of Figure 1 . The change in …nancial globalization was much larger and more varied across countries. Table 4 is analogous to Table 3 , but uses the logs of the independent variables. The dependent variable in each regression remains the same. Qualitatively the results are identical to the earlier results. Table 4 can also be used to consider a proportional change in trade and …nancial globalization. This implies an equal change in the logs of the …nancial and trade globalization variables. The coe¢ cients of all regressions in Table 4 imply that proportional globalization raises the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and raises the ratio of standard deviations of gross ‡ows and net ‡ows. We can summarize the results from this section in the form of a couple of stylized facts.
Stylized Fact 1 Financial globalization raises the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and raises the standard deviation of gross ‡ows relative to the standard deviation of net ‡ows.
Stylized Fact 2 When capital ‡ows are normalized by external assets and liabilities, …nancial globalization lowers the volatility of net ‡ows while it does not a¤ect the volatility of gross ‡ows. When capital ‡ows are normalized by GDP, …nancial globalization has an e¤ect on net ‡ows that is not statistically signi…cant or small, while it raises the volatility of gross ‡ows.
Stylized Fact 3
The e¤ect of trade globalization is somewhat ambiguous. Results that are statistically signi…cant show that trade globalization lowers the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and the ratio of the volatilities of gross ‡ows and net ‡ows.
Stylized Fact 4 Proportional …nancial and trade globalization raises the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and the ratio of the volatilities of gross ‡ows and net ‡ows.
These results are also consistent with the …ndings from Table 2 . They explain the higher correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows of advanced countries, especially in the second half of the sample. Stylized Fact 2 also explains the dependence on normalization of the changes in gross and net capital ‡ow volatilities reported in Table 2 .
The Model
The model aims to shed light on the impact of …nancial and trade globalization on the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. The model consists of two countries (Home and Foreign), two periods, and two types of agents. The agents are native and global investors. Native investors in both countries only hold domestic assets, while global investors hold globally diversi…ed portfolios. The extent of …nancial globalization is measured by the relative fraction of the global agents, which determines the size of external assets and liabilities in the absence of any shocks. The extent of trade globalization is driven by a home preference parameter in the consumption index of Home and Foreign goods. The objective will be to investigate how increases in …nancial and trade globalization a¤ect the volatility of gross and net capital ‡ows in response to various shocks, and therefore the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. There will be a total of 14 shocks (7 types of shocks in both Home and Foreign).
Production and Investment
There is a Home good and a Foreign good. Output in period i = 1; 2 is equal to productivity times the capital stock:
In period 1 we assume that the capital stock is K in both countries:
Capital accumulates due to new investment:
There is no depreciation. Productivity is equal to
where " Hi and " F i are Home and Foreign productivity shocks with mean 0. We will also refer to " H1 and " F 1 as current income shocks. Changes in the expectations E(" H2 ) and E(" F 2 ) will be referred to as expected dividend shocks as they will a¤ect expected asset payo¤s. They are a type of news shock. Capital goods are supplied by competitive installment …rms. In the Home country they produce I H new capital goods in period 1 and sell them to …rms at the price Q H . Producing I H capital goods requires
of Home consumption goods. The price of Home consumption goods in period 1 is P H1 . More generally we will denote Home and Foreign consumptions goods prices in period i respectively P Hi and P F i . The installment …rms maximize
This gives
This is the Tobin Q model of investment. For the Foreign country we have analogously
The shocks " I H and " I F will be referred to as investment shocks. If positive, they raise investment for given relative prices of capital and consumption goods.
Saving and Portfolio Allocation
Home agents maximize lnC
where
Here C We assume
" H is a Home time discount rate shock, which we will also refer to as a saving shock. A positive value implies an increase in Home saving. " Hi , i = 1; 2, are preference shocks, which we will also refer to as trade shocks. A positive value implies a shift towards Foreign goods and therefore an increase in trade. The equilibrium in period 1 will be a¤ected by both period 1 trade shocks " H1 and expectations of period 2 trade shocks, E(" H2 ). The parameter 2 [0:5; 1] captures a bias towards domestic goods. In the absence of shocks a fraction will be spent on domestic goods. As we lower from 1 to 0.5, trade increases from zero (autarky) to its maximum level with perfect goods market integration.
Foreign agents similarly maximize ln C
where C F Hi and C F F i are demand for respectively Home and Foreign goods by Foreign agents and
" F and " F i , i = 1; 2, are the Foreign saving and trade shocks.
There is a Home asset and a Foreign asset. These assets are claims on period 2 output per unit of capital. The return from period 1 to period 2 on Home and Foreign assets is
Now consider the consumption and portfolio decisions. There are native investors and global investors in both countries. Native investors only hold claims on domestic assets, while global investors optimally diversify across Home and Foreign assets. In each country there are m global investors and 1 m native investors. The parameter m is critical as it will determine the size of external assets and liabilities and therefore …nancial globalization.
Parameterizing …nancial globalization this way has the appeal that an increase in m implies not only larger external …nancial assets and liabilities, but also a larger portfolio response to an expected return di¤erential between Home and Foreign assets. In models where home bias shows up additively in portfolios, for example as a result of a cost of investing abroad that lowers the return, the extent of return arbitrage is independent of the extent of …nancial integration. A di¤erent approach that delivers the same positive relationship between external claims and return arbitrage assumes that there is a friction that captures an information asymmetry, implying a perceived variance of returns that is a factor 1 + larger for foreign agents than domestic agents. When = 2(1 m)=m, this generates the same equilibrium as in our model. 5 At the start of period 1, the native investors hold a fraction 1 m of the domestic capital stock. Home and Foreign global investors hold the same portfolio at the start of period 1. Both hold a fraction 0:5m of Home and Foreign capital. The wealth of Home and Foreign native investors in period 1 is then
The wealth consists of the dividends from the asset claims at the start of period 1 plus the principal value of the claims plus the pro…ts from the installment …rms. The assumption that the pro…ts from installment …rms goes to the native investors is just a technicality as it drops out with linearization. The wealth of the Home and Foreign global investors is
The wealth is the same for Home and Foreign global investors and equal to the dividends and principal value from the claims of a fraction 0:5m of both Home and Foreign assets. Global investors make both saving and portfolio decisions, while native investors only make a saving decision. Native investors receive the domestic return in period 2, R H for Home native investors and R F for Foreign native investors. Home global investors receive a portfolio return in period 2 of
where z H is the share invested in Home assets. The portfolio return of Foreign global investors, R p;F , is the same, with the portfolio share in Home asset z F .
As a result of log utility, optimal consumption decisions do not depend on expected portfolio returns. Both Home native and global investors consume a fraction 1=(1 + H ) of their wealth and save a fraction H =(1 + H ). Aggregate consumption by Home agents in both periods is then
with consumption allocated across the two goods according to
where P H i is the consumption price index of Home agents, which is
Analogous equations apply to Foreign agents. The …rst-order condition of portfolio choice of Home global investors is
In terms of logs this is
Using the log linear approximation r p;H = z H r H + (1 z H )r F , de…ning the excess return er = r H r F , and assuming normality of log returns, we can solve for the optimal portfolio:
Analogous for example to Devereux and Engel (2002) and Hau (1998), we assume that the expectation of the excess return is E(er) + " er H , which is the sum of the rational expectation E(er) and an expectational error. We will write " (Wang (1994) ). 6 The speci…cation for Foreign global investors is analogous:
An increase in both " z H and " z F then generates a global retrenchment towards domestic assets. This may be part of a global …nancial cycle as Rey (2013) has suggested. In the absence of any shocks to the model, z H = z F = 0:5, so both Home and Foreign global investors hold perfectly diversi…ed portfolios.
Capital out ‡ows and in ‡ows are equal to
These external asset purchases are equal to the value of external positions in period 1 minus the value of the positions at the start of period 1, which they carry over from the previous period.
Market Clearing Conditions
The asset market clearing conditions are
In the Home asset market clearing condition (37), the …rst term on the right hand side is the sum of Home asset demand by the Home native agents, The period 1 goods market clearing conditions are
The period 2 goods market clearing conditions are
Shocks
There are a total of 14 shocks, which are listed in Table 5 . Ten shocks are current (period 1) shocks, while four are news shocks in the form of changing expectations of period 2 innovations. The latter include expected period 2 dividend innovations and trade innovations. For convenience of the analysis, we will rewrite all shocks as average shocks and relative shocks. For example, we transform the saving shocks " H and " F into an average saving shock and a relative saving shock:
Throughout we will use the superscript A to denote an average across countries and superscript D to denote the di¤erence (Home minus Foreign variable).
Solution
There are six market equilibrium equations. After substituting the expressions for consumption, investment, wealth and portfolio shares into the six market equilibrium conditions, they depend on six variables: Home and Foreign goods prices in both periods and the Home and Foreign asset 
z F prices in period 1. We log-linearize around the point where there are no shocks. We then take the averages and di¤erences of the market clearing conditions across countries. We refer to the average of Home and Foreign market clearing conditions as the global market clearing condition. We refer to the di¤erence between Home and Foreign market clearing conditions as the relative market clearing condition. Denoting logs of variables with lower case letters, the averages and di¤erences across countries of the endogenous variables are: p
Because of Walras' Law, two of the market clearing conditions are redundant (one per period). We remove the …rst and second period global goods market clearing condition, which are the same as the global asset market clearing condition. Correspondingly, we can remove two variables. Since the model only determines relative prices, we normalize the average of the log goods prices in both periods to be to 0: p We leave all algebraic details to the Online Technical Appendix. The global asset market clearing condition can be used to solve for the average asset price:
Intuitively, a positive average current income shock (positive " The other three market clearing conditions are
where = 4 (1 )! + (2 1)(2 + m 2) and CA, S I and N F , scaled by external assets 0:5mK in the absence of shocks, are
Combining (44), (45) and the period 1 expectation of (46), we can solve jointly for p
Gross and Net Capital Flows
Using the solution for q A , we have a closed form solution for gross ‡ows GF = OF + IF as a fraction of external assets:
Four shocks drive gross ‡ows. The …rst two shocks, " ;A and " A 1 , raise global saving, which raises gross capital ‡ows through a portfolio growth e¤ect. Without a change in portfolio allocation, higher saving leads to an increase in demand of both domestic and foreign assets. The third shock, the average investment shock " I;A , reduces the average asset price q A , which lowers consumption and therefore also raises global saving. The last shock, " z;A , is a global portfolio shift towards domestic assets (retrenchment), which reduces gross capital ‡ows. An example of this is a global increase in risk or risk-aversion that leads to a retrenchment towards domestic assets, as occurred during the Great Recession (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011)). Using the now popular terminology introduced by Rey (2013) , one can think of " z;A as a shock to the global …nancial cycle.
Substituting the solution for p
2 ) in the expression (47) for N F gives a solution for net capital ‡ows. One can think of net capital ‡ows from a portfolio perspective (N F ), a saving minus investment perspective (S I) or a trade perspective (CA). Relative goods and asset prices will adjust to make sure these are always the same.
Net capital ‡ows depend on 7 shocks. Three shocks originate from the saving/investment side. An increase in "
;D raises relative Home saving. From a portfolio perspective this leads to net capital out ‡ows by global investors through two channels. The …rst is portfolio growth, where a fraction of the higher saving by global investors is invested abroad. The second e¤ect is more indirect and operates through portfolio reallocation. The higher relative saving of Home native agents raises relative demand for Home assets, which raises q D . The higher relative price of Home assets lowers the expected excess return on Home assets, which leads to portfolio reallocation to Foreign assets by global investors. A positive relative income shock " 2 ) implies an expected preference shock towards Foreign goods in the next period, which raises the expected period 2 relative price of Foreign goods. This raises the expected relative return on Foreign assets, leading to net capital out ‡ows.
Two shocks a¤ecting net capital ‡ows originate directly from the portfolio side. A positive " z;D implies an exogenous portfolio shift towards Home assets, leading to net capital in ‡ows. A rise in E(" D 2 ) raises the expected relative Home dividends, which raises the expected excess return on Home assets and also generates net capital in ‡ows.
Three shocks a¤ect neither in ‡ows nor out ‡ows. These are E("
a¤ects portfolio returns, but not excess returns. As a result of the assumed log utility, expected portfolio returns do not a¤ect the saving decision and therefore do not impact capital ‡ows. "
;A 1 is a global trade home bias shock. It a¤ects the trade volume (exports plus imports), but not net trade ‡ows or gross capital ‡ows. The same is the case for E(" 
Model Implications for Capital Flow Moments
We now discuss the implications of the model for the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. It is useful to repeat (1):
There is therefore a positive relationship between the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows and the relative volatility of gross ‡ows and net ‡ows. We will consider the impact of …nancial and trade globalization on this relative volatility. Since in the absence of shocks external assets are 0:5mK and imports=exports=(1 )AK, we can measure …nancial and trade globalization respectively with the parameters m and 1 . The impact of …nancial globalization on the volatilities of gross and net ‡ows depends on whether we scale capital ‡ows by external assets (0:5mK), GDP (AK) or we do not scale at all. However, the impact of both …nancial and trade globalization parameters on the relative volatility of gross ‡ows and net ‡ows does not depend on scaling. Most of the results will be based on scaling capital ‡ows by external assets 0:5mK as we will see that this simpli…es the analysis. But it is important to emphasize that the scaling does not matter for the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
A priori it is not immediately clear that …nancial globalization would imply a higher correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows. One might expect that …nancial globalization increases both the volatility of gross ‡ows and net ‡ows. We …nd that …nancial globalization indeed increases the volatility of gross ‡ows when divided by GDP, while numerical results show that the impact on net ‡ows as a fraction of GDP can go both ways. The increased volatility of gross ‡ows always dominates, but this is a numerical result that does not have an intuitive explanation. We will show that when instead we divide capital ‡ows by external assets we obtain a clean and intuitive result: …nancial globalization does not a¤ect the volatility of gross ‡ows, but reduces the volatility of net ‡ows. It therefore unambiguously raises the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Trade globalization also does not a¤ect the volatility of gross ‡ows, but raises the volatility of net ‡ows. It therefore reduces the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows. In the remainder of this section we will explicitly derive these results.
Gross Flows
Results for gross ‡ows are the most straightforward. It is useful to repeat (50):
When capital ‡ows are scaled by external assets, gross ‡ows do not depend on either the …nancial globalization parameter m or the trade globalization parameter 1 .
Result 1 When gross ‡ows are scaled by external assets, neither …nancial nor trade globalization a¤ects the volatility of gross ‡ows.
Especially for …nancial globalization, this result is consistent with the empirical analysis in Section 2 (Stylized Fact 2). Both cross section regressions and panel regressions …nd no e¤ect of …nancial globalization on the volatility of gross capital ‡ows when scaled by external assets and liabilities. The results for trade globalization are mixed as there is a positive e¤ect of trade globalization on the gross capital ‡ow volatility in cross section regressions and no e¤ect in panel regressions.
The logic behind this result is as follows. Gross ‡ows and gross external holdings both increase proportional to m. As a fraction of external holdings, gross ‡ows are therefore independent of m. Consider for example an increase in " z;A . This is a portfolio shock that leads to a global retrenchment towards domestic assets. The retrenchment only applies to global investors in the model and is therefore proportional to m. The impact of the shock on gross ‡ows is then proportional to m. Gross external assets and liabilities are also proportional to m as only global investors hold foreign assets. Gross ‡ows and positions are therefore both proportional to m. This is also consistent with the …ndings in Tables 3 and 4 that when gross ‡ows are not scaled by external assets (scaled by GDP) …nancial globalization raises gross ‡ow volatility (Stylized Fact 2). Trade globalization only a¤ects gross and net trade ‡ows in the model, not gross capital ‡ows. This does not depend on how we scale capital ‡ows.
Net Flows: Special Case
Analyzing the impact of globalization on net capital ‡ow volatility is a bit more involved. While it is possible to derive a closed form analytical solution of net ‡ows as a function of the shocks, the expression is lengthy and its volatility is a highly non-linear function of both …nancial and trade globalization parameters. We therefore start with a special case, where Home and Foreign goods are perfect substitutes. This happens when ! = 1. In that case p
Imposing N F = S I, using the expressions (47) and (48) for N F and S I, we can solve
(52) De…ne = 1 + 4=var(er) and = 1=(1 + ). Writing the denominator of (52) as D(m) and substituting (52) back into the net capital ‡ow expression (47), we have
The absolute value of the coe¢ cients in front of the shocks clearly declines as m rises. The numerator of the ratios is either a negative function of m or independent of m, while D(m) in the denominator depends positively on m. It is therefore unambiguous that net capital ‡ows, scaled by external assets, become less volatile as m rises.
Result 2 In the special case where Home and Foreign goods are perfect substitutes, …nancial globalization reduces the volatility of net capital ‡ows scaled by external assets.
This result is consistent with Stylized Fact 2. Both the panel and cross section regressions show that an increase in …nancial globalization reduces the volatility of net capital ‡ows as a share of external assets in a statistically signi…cant way.
Together with Result 1, the following corollary applies Corollary 1 When Home and Foreign goods are perfect substitutes, …nancial globalization increases the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
No results about trade integration apply in this special case. The parameter plays no role as Home and Foreign goods are perfect substitutes. Gross trade ‡ows are then indeterminate.
To illustrate Result 2, Figure 3 shows the impact of a portfolio shift towards Foreign assets, which implies a negative value of " z;D . The same analysis applies when the shift towards Foreign assets is a result of drop in the expected relative Home dividend (decline in E(" Only the S I schedule depends on m. The S I schedule is ‡atter the larger m. Figure 3 therefore shows the S I schedule for both a low m (steep) and a high m ( ‡at). A portfolio shift towards Foreign assets (drop in " z;D ) shifts up the N F schedule, while leaving the S I schedule unchanged. For a low m the equilibrium is at point B, while for a high m it is at point C. Scaled by external assets, the response of net out ‡ows to the portfolio shock is therefore smaller under more …nancial globalization. The portfolio shift towards Foreign assets leads to an increase in the relative price of the Foreign assets, or a drop in q D . The ultimate response of net capital ‡ows depends on how responsive saving and investment are to the change in q D . If they were not responsive at all, there will be no net capital ‡ows. In that case q D drops enough, raising the relative return on the Home assets, to shift the portfolio allocation all the way back to its starting point. We have already seen that S I depends negatively on q D , so that a drop in q D leads to net out ‡ows. But the e¤ect is dampened as m is larger, for two reasons. First, a rise in m implies that there are fewer native investors, which reduces the change in relative saving. Relative wealth and saving of global investors are una¤ected. Second, both saving and investment are scaled by external assets. A rise in m reduces the scaled saving and investment. For both of these reasons the net capital out ‡ow response as a share of external assets is dampened as m rises. It is of interest to also consider what happens to net capital out ‡ows if we do not scale by external assets. There are now two opposing forces. First, the N F schedule will shift up more for a higher m. The portfolio shock is larger when there are more global investors that change their portfolio. This by itself implies that …nancial globalization increases net capital ‡ows. On the other hand, more global investors also implies that there is more return arbitrage. More investors change portfolios in response to a change in the expected return di¤erence. A smaller change in q D is needed to clear markets. This e¤ect, which corresponds to a steeper N F schedule, leads …nancial globalization to dampen net capital ‡ows. 7 Numerically we …nd that net capital out ‡ows …rst increase and then drop in size as we keep raising m from 0 to 1. This is consistent with the mixed results in Tables 3 and 4 , where the e¤ect of …nancial globalization on the volatility of net ‡ows relative to GDP is insigni…cant or positive and small (Stylized Fact 2).
The standard deviation of gross ‡ows increases proportionately with m when capital ‡ows are not scaled by external assets. Even if the volatility of net capital ‡ows increases with m, the ratio of the volatilities of gross and net ‡ows will still be dominated by the increased volatility if gross ‡ows. But this is not an obvious result. Scaling by external assets makes it much more transparent that the volatility of gross ‡ows rises relative to the volatility of net ‡ows as m increases, generating a higher correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
Net Capital Flows: The General Case
We …nally consider the general case where ! is …nite, so that Home and Foreign goods are imperfect substitutes. In that case we need to solve for relative goods prices as well and it is hard to get clean analytical results. We therefore illustrate the impact of the various shocks on net capital ‡ows through a numerical illustration. The drawback of this is that we need to pick speci…c parameters. But we …nd that the parameter values have little qualitative e¤ect on the results. When varying the degree of …nancial globalization with the parameter m, we hold = 0:86. When varying the degree of trade integration, we hold m = 0:2. Figure 4 reports the impact of shocks on net capital ‡ows scaled by external assets when varying m from 0 to 1. The shocks are normalized to 1 or -1, with the sign such that the response of net capital ‡ows is positive. Figure 4 shows that for all shocks an increase in m reduces the size of net capital ‡ows scaled by external assets. 9 The numerical analysis implies the following …nding.
Result 3 When Home and Foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, numerical analysis implies that an increase in …nancial globalization reduces the impact of shocks on net capital ‡ows scaled by external assets. Financial globalization therefore reduces the volatility of net capital ‡ows as a fraction of external assets.
Thus the results for the special case where goods are perfect substitutes in section 4.2 generalizes to the case where goods are imperfect substitutes. Figure 5 shows that a very di¤erent picture emerges when net out ‡ows are scaled by GDP. In some cases the size of net out ‡ows increases monotonically with the …nancial globalization parameter m. In others it …rst increases and then decreases with m. These results are not inconsistent with the ambiguous e¤ect of …nancial globalization on the volatility of net capital ‡ows as a share of GDP found in the data when globalization increases (Stylized Fact 2). Figure 6 shows the impact of trade globalization. De…ne T rade as exports or imports in the absence of shocks. As we vary from 1 to 0.5, T rade=GDP (on the horizontal axis) changes from 0 to 0.5. In all cases net out ‡ows increase as we increase trade globalization. 10 The following result applies.
Result 4 When Home and Foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, numerical analysis implies that an increase in trade globalization increases the impact of shocks on net capital ‡ows, therefore increasing the volatility of net capital ‡ows.
In the case of trade globalization, it does not matter for the theory whether we scale by external assets or GDP as neither depend on .
Since we have already established that neither …nancial nor trade globalization a¤ect the volatility of gross capital ‡ows as a share of external assets, the following corollary applies (subject to minor quali…cations noted above).
Corollary 2 When Home and Foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, …nancial globalization increases the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, while trade globalization decreases the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
As a …nal exercise we consider the theoretical impact of jointly increasing …nancial and trade globalization. For this purpose we vary m from 0 to 1, while setting 1 = 0:5m. This leads to a gradual change from …nancial and trade autarky to perfect integration along both dimensions. The …nancial and trade globalization measures stay in a constant ratio. Figure 7 reports the results, with net capital ‡ows scaled by external assets. For all shocks net capital ‡ows decline with the joint globalization. Since neither …nancial not trade globalization a¤ects the volatility of gross capital ‡ows, the following result applies.
Result 5 When Home and Foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, numerical analysis implies that a proportional joint increase in trade and …nancial globalization increases the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
While we have seen that …nancial and trade globalization have an opposite e¤ect on the correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows, this result says that …nancial globalization has a larger e¤ect when they are changed proportionately. This is consistent with Stylized Fact 4 from the empirical analysis. Of course in the data the globalization has been highly skewed towards …nancial globalization. As our results have shown, this further reinforces the increase in the correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. 
Conclusion
We have aimed to explain the rapidly increasing correlation between capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows seen in the data and the much higher correlation in more advanced countries. Both empirical evidence and theory point to a clear culprit, the increased level of …nancial globalization measured by the increased stock of external assets and liabilities. Trade globalization has the exact opposite e¤ect, but has been signi…cantly dominated by …nancial globalization in the last several decades. Even if trade and …nancial globalization had grown proportionally, we …nd that the higher correlation between in ‡ows and out ‡ows due to …nancial globalization would still have dominated.
A natural direction for future work is to extend the theoretical framework developed here to a multi-country setup with countries varying in terms of their extent of …nancial and trade integration, their size, and the magnitude of country-speci…c shocks. This will allow us to consider additional stylized facts, such as the co-movement of capital ‡ows across countries (global …nancial cycle) and the correlation between bilateral in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
